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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 47694-2020

)
)

V.

)

Jerome County Case N0.
CR27-18—6751

)

RYAN LEE WEEMS,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

Has Weems failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years, with three years ﬁxed, and retained jurisdiction upon his
conviction for grand theft?

ARGUMENT
Weems Has
A.

Failed

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Weems

stole $1,184.59

worth of merchandise from Wal-Mart.

(R., pp.10-1 1, 69-72.)

He

did so by placing various items into a shopping cart and then exiting the store With the unpaid

merchandize through an emergency ﬁre

He

exit,

which activated an audible alarm.

(R., pp.10, 69.)

quickly loaded the stolen merchandize into his vehicle and ﬂed. (R., p.10.)

The
42.)

state

charged

Weems

With grand

theft,

Idaho Code § 18-2407(1)(b)(1).

Weems pled guilty pursuant t0 a plea agreement.

L.18; p.15, Ls.17-20.)

three determinate,

The

state

was

Weems

and the court issued a bench warrant for

turned himselfin.

During sentencing, the

(R., p.62; 2/1 1/19 Tr., p.4, Ls.1 1-16.)

set out for sentencing. (2/1 1/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.)

t0 appear at the sentencing hearing

Eventually,

(R., pp.59-63; 2/1 1/19 Tr., p.10,

L.4

— p.1 1,

agreed t0 recommend a suspended sentence of ﬁve years, with

and four years 0f probation.

the entry ofplea, the case

(R., pp.41-

state

(1

Following

Weems failed

his arrest.

(R., p.74.)

1/18/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-13; p.14, Ls.9-12.)

recommended a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years, with three years

ﬁxed, and a period 0f retained jurisdiction.

(11/18/19 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-24.)

The

recommend probation because Weems had

violated the terms of the plea agreement

appear for the original sentencing hearing.

(1

1/18/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.9-23.)

probation. (1 1/18/19 Tr., p.15, L.13

— p.16,

years, With three years determinate,

and retained

L.18.)

state did

by

not

failing to

Weems recommended

The court imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve

jurisdiction.

(R., pp.89-93; 11/18/19 Tr., p.25,

Ls.1 1-16.)

Weems timely appealed.

B.

Standard

(R., pp.94-97.)

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

that the

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

V.

Will be the defendant's

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Where
is

a sentence

is

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

is

27 (2000)).

When a trial court’s discretionary decision

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the

lower court:

(1)

perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted Within the boundaries of such

discretion; (3) acted consistently With

it;

it

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by an

any legal standards applicable

to the speciﬁc choices before

exercise of reason. State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

429

P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citation omitted).

Weems Has Shown N0 Abuse Of The District Court’s

C.

T0
that,

Sentencing Discretion

carry the burden 0f demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant must establish

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

sentence

was

excessive.

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining Whether the appellant met

this

the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant

is

burden,

0n parole

exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be

the period ofactual incarceration. State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)

(citing

Lver, 144 Idaho

the appellant

at

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

must demonstrate

that reasonable

T0

establish that the sentence

was

excessive,

minds could not conclude the sentence was

appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘A sentence

is

reasonable if it appears

necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

all

the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96,

P.3d

at

1236-37 (quoting State

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

0f

392

Here, the imposed sentence ﬁts within the statutory limits.

grand theft committed in a manner prescribed by Idaho Code
the

maximum penalty is fourteen years. LC.

§ 18-2408(2)(a).

sentence 0f ﬁve years, with three years ﬁxed.

(R.,

is

m1, 137 Idaho

cannot d0

Weems’s sentence

is

He
As

reasonable.

The

district court

is

one year, and

imposed a uniﬁed

maximum Weems “must show

so.

the district court observed,

Weems

has a lengthy

—

p.25, L.6;

was

his fourth

criminal history and “a propensity for criminal conduct.” (1 1/18/19 Tr., p.23, L.25

ﬂ

PSI, pp.19-25.)

Although

this case constituted his ﬁrst felony conviction,

lifetime conviction for theft. (1 1/1 8/19 T11, p.23,

had ten misdemeanor convictions
theft.”’

the

L.

(1

His

new

Weems was

L25 — p.24, L.2; PSI, pp.19-25.)

new

cases. (1 1/1 8/19 T11, p.24, L.23

theft,

and burglary. (PSI, pp.23-24.)
district court

expressly considered the

contents 0fthe PSI and the four goals 0f sentencing. (1 1/18/19 Tr., p.21, L.14

11/18/19 Tr., p.16, L.19

— p.19, L.15

court concluded that Whether

but

it

— p.25,

charges included Violating a n0 contact order, criminal trespass, carrying a

Moreover, in fashioning Weems’s sentence the

it

Weems

In total,

found “revolve[d] around drug use, Violence, and

charged in ﬁve

concealed weapon, failing to appear, petit

sentence

it

1/18/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-19 (quoting PSI, p.24); PSI, pp.19-25.) Additionally, during

pendency of this case

1 .)

that the court

that

excessive under any reasonable View 0f the facts.”

the sentence, in light of the governing criteria,

460, 50 P.3d at 475.

18-2407(1)(b)(1)

for

pp.86-93; 11/18/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.1 1-14.)

Because the imposed sentence does not exceed the statutory

at

§

The minimum sentence

— p.22,

L.4;

ﬂ alﬂ

(discussing detailed information contained in the PSI).)

Weems had

a substance abuse issue or not

was immaterial

The

to the

imposed because 0n the one hand drug use might explain why he committed the crime,

does not excuse

it.

(1

1/18/19 Tr., p.22, L.16

— p.23,

L.

1 .)

On the

other hand, if Weems did

not have a substance abuse issue, then his criminal conduct was “very deliberate.”

(1 1/ 1 8/ 19 Tr.,

p.23, Ls.1-5; p.25, Ls.1-6.) Either way, the court concluded that “the retained jurisdiction route

the

way t0

is

go.” (1 1/18/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-10.)

Despite stating that the district court imposed an excessive sentence (Appellant’s brief,

pp.1, 11),

Weems

does not argue in his opening brief how the sentence imposed was excessive

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-1

1.)

Instead,

Weems

argues that the district court abused

its

discretion

by

giving insufﬁcient weight to mitigating factors such as his mental health, substance abuse,
willingness t0 pay restitution, remorse and acceptance of responsibility, and lack 0f prior felony
convictions.

factors

According

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-11.)

been given

their proper weight,

(Appellant’s brief, p.1

1.)

health,

and the

him 0n

probation.”

His argument lacks merit.

Weems’s

fact that this

trial

was

t0 the mitigating evidence presented

know

by Weems.

his ﬁrst felony.

(1

existed.”

(1

—

1/18/19 Tr., p.13, L.1

p.15, L.15.)

Then,

get “clean, sober” and “learn[] 0f

1/18/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25.)

He

also stated that he

“deserve[d] everything that’s happened t0 [him]” and that he wanted t0 pay restitution in any

he could.

(1

1/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-13.)

abuse issues, the

district court

With respect

t0

GAIN

Weems’s mental

way

health and substance

vocally considered the appropriate amount of mitigating weight to

be given to Weems’s mental health and substance abuse
0f the PSI and the

In

counsel highlighted his substance abuse issues, his mental

Weems himself acknowledged that being arrested caused him to
resources that [he] didn’t

0f these mitigating

all

the court should have placed

The court gave proper consideration
mitigation of sentence

Weems, “had

t0

issues.

assessment and asked Weems’s

diagnoses and the related treatment recommendations.

(1 1/1

The court

trial

cited speciﬁc portions

counsel t0 clarify

8/19 Tr., p.16, L.19

— p.19,

Weems’s
L.15.)

Notwithstanding the mitigating information highlighted by Weems, the information
presented t0 the district court proved that

Weems was not a

suitable candidate for probation.

The

court explicitly considered that information in light of I.C. § 19-2521. (1 1/18/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.2-

4.)

In determining whether t0 place

Weems 0n

probation 0r t0 impose sentence and retain

19-2521 “directs the [c]ourt to impose a period 0f

jurisdiction, the court recognized that §

supervised probation unless the [c]ourt ﬁnds that there are factors that mitigate against that
(1 1/ 1 8/ 1

9 T11, p.22, Ls.3- 1 5.) Relying primarily 0n the information contained in the PSI, the court

concluded that there was a likelihood 0f the commission of another criminal offense

were placed on a period of supervised probation.
p.23, L.25- p.25, L.16.)

use.

(1

....”

—

1/18/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.5-15; see 11/18/19 Tr.,

Weems’s had

a history 0f Violence, theft, and drug

p.24, L.19.)

Weems had

been placed “‘on probation multiple

times and violated his probation 0n at least two 0ccasions.”’
PSI, p.24).)

Beyond that, Weems had

was placed “0n probation

in

Canyon and Ada County.”

Weems had

8/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.19-22 (citing

Furthermore, retaining jurisdiction

is

and then

Neither of those

(PSI, pp.24-25.)

already missed multiple appointments in

With his probation ofﬁcer.” (PSI, p.25.)

intake interview

defendant’s suitability for probation.”

(1 1/1

failed to appear for his original sentencing hearing

probations were going particularly well as

Ada County and missed his

simply “a means of extending the time t0 evaluate a

State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567,

650 P.2d 707, 709

may ﬁnd at the conclusion 0f the period of retained jurisdiction

(Ct.

App. 1982). The

district court

that

Weems has been

sufﬁciently rehabilitated and thus suitable for probation in this case.

In any event,

Weems has

failed t0

show

rejected his request for probation and instead

mitigating factors

Weems

sentence imposed,

much

relies

Weems

that

The court noted

1/18/19 Tr., p.23, L.25

(1

if

that the district court

him on

its

imposed sentence and retained

on did not require the court

less place

abused

probation.

t0

impose a

discretion

When

jurisdiction.

it

The

lesser sentence than the

In light 0f his history of theft convictions

W

and his documented history 0f Violating probation, the

when

it

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve

The

state respectfully requests this

district court did

years, With three years ﬁxed,

not abuse

its

discretion

and retained jurisdiction.

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2020.

Justin R. Porter

/s/

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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